...the United States pledges before you, and therefore before the world, its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma - to devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.[Dwight Eisenhower, 1953-12-08]
I think iso-breeders started on U-233 offer a much better path to the rapid expansion of peaceful nuclear energy, in a way that discourages proliferation while being diplomatic and respectful. We can make plenty of U-233 from our stockpiles of spent fuel and sell it to developing nations with only one string attached: weaponize it (which would be very difficult), and you'll lose access to more. The salts in a LFTR aren't consumable, and would allow reactors to be fueled by thorium, indefinitely. Who would risk that, or even contemplate sacrificing the heart of a reactor that could otherwise be renewed indefinitely, for a one-time weapon?
I didn't realize how reasonable the NPT was, and somehow conflated it with the 123 agreements. Maybe because I have no memory of the US being anything but fanatical in their anti-proliferation nonsense, clamping down on every absurd pathway, including recycling. (Like defining thorium as "source material", or U-233 as "weapons grade" even when contaminated with U-232, or the hysteria over safeguarding reactor grade plutonium and transuranics in spent fuel, and even the preference for non-recyclable fuel forms like TRISO.)
All the while, encouraging the continued use of U-235 burners and HALEU that will require an explosion of uranium mining and enrichment around the world; talk about senseless proliferation-maximizing policy. I'm all for discouraging uranium enrichment, but we can't reasonably do that with reactors that require enriched fuel, or by discouraging recycling, which could be done in much better ways. Fortunately, the stupidly expensive and complicated plutonium separation needed to fabricate solid MOX fuel, is already discouraging enough by itself.
I say again, and again, and again nuclear's problem is not technological and cannot be solved by technology. Accordingly the GKN refrains from commenting on this or that technology. Otherwise I'd have to take issue with some of yr technical points.
Great article showing the inconsistency of the rule makers. Also good to see that you’re familiar with Dr Cohen, one of my personal heroes in the fight for nuclear power .
As an aside though, truly we have sufficient knowledge of nature to use her effectively for abundant food, rapid travel and of course, inexpensive, dispatch able energy. Our impediments to success are manmade.
When President Carter started his Plutonium initiative in 1977 I drew the lot to explain it to Belgium. I can still here the refrain "How can you do this to us, we are such a small country?"
As far as I was concerned, that initiative really put the nail in the coffin for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
Great article on Atoms for Peace and the NPT and what they meant for nuclear power.
I'm certainly not an expert on the RBMK, but I think it was the other way around. The RBMK was a civilian version of the Soviet Pu producing reactors, but optimized for power production. The BM in the middle means Big Power. I dont know that the RBMK itself was ever used in Pu production. Weapons grade plutonium production requires rapid change out (every 60 days or so) of the fuel rods which gets in the way of power production. Maybe some member of the choir can be more specific?
Jack, I am still worried about the proliferation problem. I don't think we should just dismiss these concerns as "the last bastion of the anti-nuke" along with the all their BS on safety, waste, and cost.
I think the greatest threat to a low-carbon future, powered by safe and secure nuclear, is the possibility of a terrorist event destroying public confidence and setting us back for decades.
Let's not make the same mistake the industry made before Three Mile Island, letting the public believe there is zero risk.
We need to have a serious discussion of these concerns, but perhaps that is better done in a different forum.
Your comment could be read multiple ways. I will assume it is a concern about terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon. It is a concern we all share, especially given the rise of state sponsored terrorist groups. If Iran can give the Houthis the latest drones, they can also give them the bomb. Nobody, least of all me, is claiming there is zero risk of that happening.
What I am claiming is that hobbling nuclear power, even outright banning nuclear power, would have at most a slight delaying effect on the time it takes to develop a bomb. If a nation wants a bomb, it will get it, unless it is stopped by force. It is wishful, panglossian nonsense to think otherwise. We've seen this work out at least 5 times. Iran is just next in line.
The NPT recognized this. The key was full inspection. The carrot was full access to nuclear power. The unspoken stick was, if we don't like what we see; or, if you don't let us inspect, we will use force to stop you. This stick has been used only once. It was successful.
If we are truly concerned about proliferation, the sad truth is we must rely on the stick. Hobbling nuclear power only gets us destitution and possibly an uninhabitable planet. It won't stop Iran from getting the bomb. It won't stop the next-Iran from getting the bomb.
Jack, I don't think it is necessary to hobble nuclear power. What I would do is limit the distribution of breeder reactors to a group of nations that everyone can trust. If Somalia is to get 10 reactors, would you rather they be ThorCons or LFTRs?
I've heard some in the pro-nuclear community say we should not base technology deployment policies on "unfounded worries". The worry from the anti-nuclear community seems to be well founded. Perhaps you can provide a better counter argument.
If I'm Somalia and I have ten reactors, my time to breakout is essentially the same whether or not they are breeders. I say again. That horse has left the barn. Any state that wants the bomb can have it. What's "unfounded" is your premise that that is not true.
"nations that everyone can trust". I wonder who t hat would be. If I'm Indonesia or Philippines would that be China? If I'm Ukraine, would that be Russia? We know we cant trust the USA. Those bastards have broken the NPT over and over again.Maybe Sweden should be the only breeder nation. Get real.
The GROUP of seller nations could include at least the first five nuclear states - USA, Russia, UK, France, and China. Is there any buyer nation that could legitimately claim to not trust at least one of them for a supply of fuel? Maybe the USA should assume buyer status, to avoid any anti-USA sentiment, and prove there is nothing wrong with that status.
The risk I see in the Somalia scenario is bad guys getting control of the country and shutting off the cameras, like North Korea did. If the reactors are ThorCons, we can hit the crane with a drone, and cut off any further supply of fuel. If they are LFTRs, they can continue operating while diverting a small flow of U-233. The the level of military force required to stop this will be much greater and more difficult to justify.
I think iso-breeders started on U-233 offer a much better path to the rapid expansion of peaceful nuclear energy, in a way that discourages proliferation while being diplomatic and respectful. We can make plenty of U-233 from our stockpiles of spent fuel and sell it to developing nations with only one string attached: weaponize it (which would be very difficult), and you'll lose access to more. The salts in a LFTR aren't consumable, and would allow reactors to be fueled by thorium, indefinitely. Who would risk that, or even contemplate sacrificing the heart of a reactor that could otherwise be renewed indefinitely, for a one-time weapon?
I didn't realize how reasonable the NPT was, and somehow conflated it with the 123 agreements. Maybe because I have no memory of the US being anything but fanatical in their anti-proliferation nonsense, clamping down on every absurd pathway, including recycling. (Like defining thorium as "source material", or U-233 as "weapons grade" even when contaminated with U-232, or the hysteria over safeguarding reactor grade plutonium and transuranics in spent fuel, and even the preference for non-recyclable fuel forms like TRISO.)
All the while, encouraging the continued use of U-235 burners and HALEU that will require an explosion of uranium mining and enrichment around the world; talk about senseless proliferation-maximizing policy. I'm all for discouraging uranium enrichment, but we can't reasonably do that with reactors that require enriched fuel, or by discouraging recycling, which could be done in much better ways. Fortunately, the stupidly expensive and complicated plutonium separation needed to fabricate solid MOX fuel, is already discouraging enough by itself.
cc
I say again, and again, and again nuclear's problem is not technological and cannot be solved by technology. Accordingly the GKN refrains from commenting on this or that technology. Otherwise I'd have to take issue with some of yr technical points.
Great article showing the inconsistency of the rule makers. Also good to see that you’re familiar with Dr Cohen, one of my personal heroes in the fight for nuclear power .
As an aside though, truly we have sufficient knowledge of nature to use her effectively for abundant food, rapid travel and of course, inexpensive, dispatch able energy. Our impediments to success are manmade.
When President Carter started his Plutonium initiative in 1977 I drew the lot to explain it to Belgium. I can still here the refrain "How can you do this to us, we are such a small country?"
As far as I was concerned, that initiative really put the nail in the coffin for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
Great article on Atoms for Peace and the NPT and what they meant for nuclear power.
Roger Zavadoski
Terrific, important article. Thank you for the William Foster quote. It helps to clarify "congressional intent" in agreeing to the NPT.
I believe RBMK reactors were used for both electricity and weapons.
Ken,
I'm certainly not an expert on the RBMK, but I think it was the other way around. The RBMK was a civilian version of the Soviet Pu producing reactors, but optimized for power production. The BM in the middle means Big Power. I dont know that the RBMK itself was ever used in Pu production. Weapons grade plutonium production requires rapid change out (every 60 days or so) of the fuel rods which gets in the way of power production. Maybe some member of the choir can be more specific?
Another example of "we have met the enemy, ... and he is us!" ???
Jack, I am still worried about the proliferation problem. I don't think we should just dismiss these concerns as "the last bastion of the anti-nuke" along with the all their BS on safety, waste, and cost.
I think the greatest threat to a low-carbon future, powered by safe and secure nuclear, is the possibility of a terrorist event destroying public confidence and setting us back for decades.
Let's not make the same mistake the industry made before Three Mile Island, letting the public believe there is zero risk.
We need to have a serious discussion of these concerns, but perhaps that is better done in a different forum.
https://www.facebook.com/groups/2081763568746983/posts/3700699726853351
David,
Your comment could be read multiple ways. I will assume it is a concern about terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon. It is a concern we all share, especially given the rise of state sponsored terrorist groups. If Iran can give the Houthis the latest drones, they can also give them the bomb. Nobody, least of all me, is claiming there is zero risk of that happening.
What I am claiming is that hobbling nuclear power, even outright banning nuclear power, would have at most a slight delaying effect on the time it takes to develop a bomb. If a nation wants a bomb, it will get it, unless it is stopped by force. It is wishful, panglossian nonsense to think otherwise. We've seen this work out at least 5 times. Iran is just next in line.
The NPT recognized this. The key was full inspection. The carrot was full access to nuclear power. The unspoken stick was, if we don't like what we see; or, if you don't let us inspect, we will use force to stop you. This stick has been used only once. It was successful.
If we are truly concerned about proliferation, the sad truth is we must rely on the stick. Hobbling nuclear power only gets us destitution and possibly an uninhabitable planet. It won't stop Iran from getting the bomb. It won't stop the next-Iran from getting the bomb.
Jack, I don't think it is necessary to hobble nuclear power. What I would do is limit the distribution of breeder reactors to a group of nations that everyone can trust. If Somalia is to get 10 reactors, would you rather they be ThorCons or LFTRs?
I've heard some in the pro-nuclear community say we should not base technology deployment policies on "unfounded worries". The worry from the anti-nuclear community seems to be well founded. Perhaps you can provide a better counter argument.
https://citizendium.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation/Debate_Guide#Blocking_Diversion_of_Plutonium_by_%22Spiking%22_the_Fuel
I think we should acknowledge the risks, and discuss how to best provide safeguards, including both carrots and sticks. You, or someone in this forum, might want to join the discussion at https://www.facebook.com/groups/2081763568746983/posts/3709056896017634
If I'm Somalia and I have ten reactors, my time to breakout is essentially the same whether or not they are breeders. I say again. That horse has left the barn. Any state that wants the bomb can have it. What's "unfounded" is your premise that that is not true.
"nations that everyone can trust". I wonder who t hat would be. If I'm Indonesia or Philippines would that be China? If I'm Ukraine, would that be Russia? We know we cant trust the USA. Those bastards have broken the NPT over and over again.Maybe Sweden should be the only breeder nation. Get real.
The GROUP of seller nations could include at least the first five nuclear states - USA, Russia, UK, France, and China. Is there any buyer nation that could legitimately claim to not trust at least one of them for a supply of fuel? Maybe the USA should assume buyer status, to avoid any anti-USA sentiment, and prove there is nothing wrong with that status.
The risk I see in the Somalia scenario is bad guys getting control of the country and shutting off the cameras, like North Korea did. If the reactors are ThorCons, we can hit the crane with a drone, and cut off any further supply of fuel. If they are LFTRs, they can continue operating while diverting a small flow of U-233. The the level of military force required to stop this will be much greater and more difficult to justify.