Sec 110 of the Atomic Energy Act (1954) is a blanket exclusion from licensing for facilities built for the account of the AEC (later DOE) and the DOD.
Section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 pulls this back. The DOD exclusion stands. But the DOE exclusion does not hold for demonstration reactors "when operated as part of the power generation facilities of an electric utility system, or when operated in any other manner for the purpose of demonstrating the suitability for commercial operation of such a reactor."
So if a plant built for the account of DOE does not send electricity to a utility, we are down to the second clause, which seems to say DOE must claim these demonstration reactors are not being operated to demonstrate commercial operation, but,I dont know, charitable operation?
Blithely assuming what they are trying to do is legal, why the July, 2026 deadline? This rules out just about everybody except possibly NuScale where DOE is desperate to show it hasnt wasted 700 million taxpayer dollars by throwing more taxpayer dollars at a nonsensical concept, a natural circulation pressurized water reactor. This is not technical progress; it's technical regression.
For clarification, the EO specifically addresses this by declaring that such testing is not for demonstrating commercial operation:
" I find that design, construction, operation, and disposition of such reactors under the auspices of the Department — and not to produce commercial electric power — would be for research purposes, rather than “for the purpose of demonstrating the suitability for commercial application of . . . a reactor” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 5842. The purpose of testing these reactors at this stage in America’s industrial evolution is to establish fundamental technological viability. Thus, at least for the foreseeable future, advanced reactors over which the Department exercises sufficient control and that do not produce commercial electric power, including those “under contract with and for the account of the [Department],” 42 U.S.C. 2140(a)(2), fall within the jurisdiction of the Department, which has authority to foster research and development in nuclear reactors. Nothing in this section alters the authority or jurisdiction of the Department of Defense."
I don't have inside knowledge, but my guess is this is not for SMRs like NuScale. Rather, it is targeting microreactors already funded directly or indirectly by the government (Oklo, Radiant, Aalo, BANR). 2026 is still super ambitious, though.
Why does a test facility need to be removed? Certainly, they need to be cleaned up at some point. But not in the foreseeable future.
While operational facilities should probably have significant space between them, an operational plant could be adjacent to a non-operational plant.
Between Hanford, Idaho National Labs, Nevada National Security Site, Savannah River, and Pantex (probably not a great list of sites), there is enough room to operate at least 10 active test facilities.
Having a lot of decommissioned sites sitting around could be used to test cleanup processes or incremental design upgrade testing.
They would only have to be removed if they no longer can post the bond or pay the rent. For the successful concepts, the test facilities will be semi-permanent testing fixes and improvements. The protopark piece makes this clear
I agree with the idea as a whole. But I think it can be tweaked to get even more participation. I think limited cleanup requirements could be a large incentive to testers.
I think the rent could be very low. Hanford alone has an enormous amount of land available. If we ever get to a point where all of Hanford is used by decommissioned test facilities, the program would be a giant success (the 1000+ sq km Hanford Site can hold a gigantic number of 1-10 sq km test sites).
I think that there is a better way to allocate the land than just renting it. For example, I would like lessees to be economically incentivized to leave the land useful for future occupants rather than requiring a complete cleanup. I would like the parties to negotiate what that includes instead of a one-size-fits-all regulation. For example, the new lessee may see value in existing cooling towers, containment buildings, transformers, parking lots, spent fuel pools, or fuel delivery facilities.
If it does need to be cleaned up by regulation, the cleanup should not leave the site empty. Ideally, only the reactor would be removed.
Alternatively, it could be more like leasing space inside a government-owned, resealable containment building and generator hall.
Also, there should be two different bonds: one for a disaster while operating the facility and one for cleanup. Once the facility stops operating, the operating bond should be canceled. Post-operation, the lessee should probably pay for regular inspections to detect environmental contamination.
The rent should cover all the costs of maintaining the test facility. The tax payer should not be subsidizing these people.
A far more important issue in my mind is restrictions imposed on selling power to the grid while testing. Proper testing will generate an enormous amount of electricity, especially the long run material tests required by concepts such as molten salt. ThorCon found that the ability to offer this power to the grid was critical to the economics of such testing.
The power won't be as reliable as normal nuclear power, but after some initial testing it will be far more reliable than intermittent sources.
Yes. But the NRC and it's billion dollar a year budget will be gone. Off the top of my head the 3000 NRC's will be replaced by a hundred of so NCA'ers, maybe 2 NMA'ers per plant plus a 100 at headquarters, and the NAB headcount should be less than 50. Based on my experience in the tanker business, the cost of UCert will certainly be less than current INPO dues. Imagine multiple INPO's competing for the plant's certification business.
But the real cost of NRC-style regulation is not the direct payments to regulators. It's the two to three hundred people at each plant producing paperwork, the money that spent on stuff and procedures that do little or nothing to imporve safety and most importantly, what it does to competition and the incentive and ability to produce electricity more cheaply.
I am certainly aware of regulation being a burden to the utility. The maintenance rule alone added thousands of man hours tracking equipment reliability and having meetings to discuss goal setting and the process for moving an SSC into or out of goal setting,
A classic example of NRC over regulation and a burden on the industry. Myself and my teammates spent hundreds of hours working on implementing this rule which applied to maintenance and engineering being performed on nuclear power plants. A good idea, but such a burden.
The NRC Maintenance Rule, formally known as 10 CFR 50.65, “Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” was issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on July 10, 1991. It aims to ensure that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) critical to the safety of nuclear power plants are maintained to reliably perform their intended safety functions. The rule is performance-based, focusing on results rather than prescribing specific maintenance methods or schedules. It requires licensees to monitor the performance or condition of SSCs against established goals to prevent safety compromises due to ineffective maintenance practices.
Key Aspects of the Maintenance Rule
1. Scope: The rule applies to SSCs that are safety-related, used in emergency operating procedures, or whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuate a safety system. However, some SSCs, like certain radiation monitoring systems, may fall outside its scope, potentially delaying repairs.
2. Monitoring and Goal Setting: Licensees must establish goals for SSC performance or condition and monitor them to ensure maintenance effectiveness. If goals are not met, corrective actions are required. The nuclear industry developed NUMARC 93-01, a guideline endorsed by the NRC, to outline acceptable monitoring programs. Licensees can use alternative methods but must demonstrate equivalence to NRC standards.
3. Risk Consideration: The rule emphasizes risk-significant SSCs, often identified using expert panels. This ensures maintenance prioritizes components critical to safety, reducing the likelihood of failures contributing to accidents.
4. Performance-Based Approach: The rule does not mandate new maintenance techniques or frequencies but requires periodic evaluation of existing maintenance activities to ensure they support safety functions.
Goal Setting Under the Maintenance Rule
Goal setting is a critical component of the Maintenance Rule, designed to ensure that maintenance activities maintain or improve the reliability and availability of SSCs. Key considerations include:
• SMART Goals: Goals should be Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound. For example, a goal might specify reducing equipment failure rates by a certain percentage within a year, aligned with broader safety and operational objectives.
• Safety Focus: Goals must prioritize safety, considering the potential impact of SSC failures on plant safety margins. Licensees often use operating experience, but early implementations showed some neglected industry-wide data, limiting goal effectiveness.
• Monitoring Levels: Goals are typically set at the system or train level for standby systems, though early implementations revealed inconsistencies in monitoring non-risk-significant standby systems.
• Periodic Evaluations: Licensees must periodically assess maintenance effectiveness against goals, balancing reliability and unavailability, and adjust maintenance plans as needed.
• Alignment with Broader Objectives: Goals should align with plant safety and business objectives, such as minimizing downtime or ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements.
Challenges and Lessons Learned
• Early Implementation: Pilot visits to nine nuclear plants in 1995 showed that while licensees were thorough in scoping SSCs, many did not adequately monitor structures or incorporate industry-wide operating experience in goal setting.
• Scope Limitations: Some critical systems, like radiation monitors, are not always covered, leading to potential delays in maintenance.
• Balancing Act: Effective goal setting requires balancing preventive and reactive maintenance (ideally 80% planned, 20% reactive) to minimize equipment failures while maintaining flexibility for unexpected issues.
Impact and Significance
The Maintenance Rule is considered a landmark regulation, praised for addressing a rising trend of maintenance-related safety issues in the 1980s. By focusing on performance outcomes, it reduces the likelihood of human errors or equipment failures contributing to nuclear accidents, acting as a key component of defense-in-depth strategies.
For further details, refer to the NRC’s official guidance at www.nrc.gov or NUMARC 93-01 for industry standards.
If you need specific guidance on implementing the Maintenance Rule or setting SMART goals for a particular nuclear facility, please provide more details, and I can tailor the response further!
The wording is mostly motherhood with which nobody can disagree. But how much substantively changed at Diablo in terms of actual inspections and maintenance in 1991? Did inspection frequency or methods change? Did proactive replacement intervals change? Most importantly, could you see the impact on unplanned scrams, downtime, and the like? How many more actual inspectors, fitters, welders, electricians, people who actually put hands on stuff did the plant need to employ? How many more non-hands on people were required?
These are not rhetorical questions. I’d really like to know the answers.
No, the maintenance rule did not really have a significant impact on resources or maintenance frequency. Pacific Gas and Electric and the Diablo Canyon Power Plant team had already implemented a preventative maintenance program with regular interval inspections and maintenance. That’s really why the plant has continued to operate so well for so many years because we started early with a thorough Preventative maintenance program.
All the maintenance rule did was add another set of eyes, and because they were from the NRC, we just ended up with more engineers and maintenance supervisors talking about how to correct maintenance problems.
Did it really improve operations as far the frequency of plant shutdowns and scrams, no I do not believe that.Shutdowns and scrams were an economic impact to the company so they were a focus from the beginning and the maintenance rule added little to no benefit in that respect
In fact, we had several major electrical fires from component failures that resulted in trips and scrams that happened after the maintenance rule was implemented. We had a series of unfortunate electrical events that fortunately did not result in any plant injuries.
I'm not interested in an AI generated number. I'm interested in your opinion. Can you make a guess at the additional number of people that resulted from the Rule? Is there a record of the staffing levels at DC through time?
GKG's estimate of the should-cost for staffing a nuclear plant is about 0.5 cents per kWh. 5.5e6 usd/kWh goes to about 0.03 cents per kWh, So if we dumbly accept Grok's number, a 6% increase for no real change, other than management being distracted from their real job.
Cost is resources consumed. It should be a primary concern of any engineer.
Let me try again. 5 million USD per year is roughly 50 people. Does that seem like a reasonable increase in the staffing level resulting from the Maintenance Rule? What were the qulalifications of these people? Colleague degree? Engineering degree? I'm just trying to learn from somebody who was there.
did you write about the DoE test reactor thing ?
Gary,
No I have not.
Sec 110 of the Atomic Energy Act (1954) is a blanket exclusion from licensing for facilities built for the account of the AEC (later DOE) and the DOD.
Section 202 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 pulls this back. The DOD exclusion stands. But the DOE exclusion does not hold for demonstration reactors "when operated as part of the power generation facilities of an electric utility system, or when operated in any other manner for the purpose of demonstrating the suitability for commercial operation of such a reactor."
So if a plant built for the account of DOE does not send electricity to a utility, we are down to the second clause, which seems to say DOE must claim these demonstration reactors are not being operated to demonstrate commercial operation, but,I dont know, charitable operation?
Blithely assuming what they are trying to do is legal, why the July, 2026 deadline? This rules out just about everybody except possibly NuScale where DOE is desperate to show it hasnt wasted 700 million taxpayer dollars by throwing more taxpayer dollars at a nonsensical concept, a natural circulation pressurized water reactor. This is not technical progress; it's technical regression.
The actual language is not a hard deadline so I read the July 2026 date as just PR.
It is says they must achieve criticality by 2026. Seems pretty hard. July 4 is definitely PR.
For clarification, the EO specifically addresses this by declaring that such testing is not for demonstrating commercial operation:
" I find that design, construction, operation, and disposition of such reactors under the auspices of the Department — and not to produce commercial electric power — would be for research purposes, rather than “for the purpose of demonstrating the suitability for commercial application of . . . a reactor” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 5842. The purpose of testing these reactors at this stage in America’s industrial evolution is to establish fundamental technological viability. Thus, at least for the foreseeable future, advanced reactors over which the Department exercises sufficient control and that do not produce commercial electric power, including those “under contract with and for the account of the [Department],” 42 U.S.C. 2140(a)(2), fall within the jurisdiction of the Department, which has authority to foster research and development in nuclear reactors. Nothing in this section alters the authority or jurisdiction of the Department of Defense."
I don't have inside knowledge, but my guess is this is not for SMRs like NuScale. Rather, it is targeting microreactors already funded directly or indirectly by the government (Oklo, Radiant, Aalo, BANR). 2026 is still super ambitious, though.
Just after I posted that comment I saw this new article: https://www.powermag.com/deadline-vs-deployment-can-u-s-advanced-reactors-meet-does-2026-criticality-goal/
This thread is off-topic. Can we talk about the Nuclear Reorganization Act?
Why does a test facility need to be removed? Certainly, they need to be cleaned up at some point. But not in the foreseeable future.
While operational facilities should probably have significant space between them, an operational plant could be adjacent to a non-operational plant.
Between Hanford, Idaho National Labs, Nevada National Security Site, Savannah River, and Pantex (probably not a great list of sites), there is enough room to operate at least 10 active test facilities.
Having a lot of decommissioned sites sitting around could be used to test cleanup processes or incremental design upgrade testing.
Alex.
They would only have to be removed if they no longer can post the bond or pay the rent. For the successful concepts, the test facilities will be semi-permanent testing fixes and improvements. The protopark piece makes this clear
https://jackdevanney.substack.com/p/part-2-prototype-testing-in-practice
See section on Ongoing Facility.
I should have made that clear in this post.
But once they stop paying the rent or are no longer allowed to test, they should clean up the space and get out. It's not their property; it's ours,
I agree with the idea as a whole. But I think it can be tweaked to get even more participation. I think limited cleanup requirements could be a large incentive to testers.
I think the rent could be very low. Hanford alone has an enormous amount of land available. If we ever get to a point where all of Hanford is used by decommissioned test facilities, the program would be a giant success (the 1000+ sq km Hanford Site can hold a gigantic number of 1-10 sq km test sites).
I think that there is a better way to allocate the land than just renting it. For example, I would like lessees to be economically incentivized to leave the land useful for future occupants rather than requiring a complete cleanup. I would like the parties to negotiate what that includes instead of a one-size-fits-all regulation. For example, the new lessee may see value in existing cooling towers, containment buildings, transformers, parking lots, spent fuel pools, or fuel delivery facilities.
If it does need to be cleaned up by regulation, the cleanup should not leave the site empty. Ideally, only the reactor would be removed.
Alternatively, it could be more like leasing space inside a government-owned, resealable containment building and generator hall.
Also, there should be two different bonds: one for a disaster while operating the facility and one for cleanup. Once the facility stops operating, the operating bond should be canceled. Post-operation, the lessee should probably pay for regular inspections to detect environmental contamination.
The rent should cover all the costs of maintaining the test facility. The tax payer should not be subsidizing these people.
A far more important issue in my mind is restrictions imposed on selling power to the grid while testing. Proper testing will generate an enormous amount of electricity, especially the long run material tests required by concepts such as molten salt. ThorCon found that the ability to offer this power to the grid was critical to the economics of such testing.
The power won't be as reliable as normal nuclear power, but after some initial testing it will be far more reliable than intermittent sources.
One minor typo: "in effect" not "in affect."
"In effect" means operating or functioning. There is no "in affect" phrase.
Thanks. Will fix in the PDF version.
Looks reasonable, but who’s paying for all this new stuff, the rate payers, correct ?
Yes. But the NRC and it's billion dollar a year budget will be gone. Off the top of my head the 3000 NRC's will be replaced by a hundred of so NCA'ers, maybe 2 NMA'ers per plant plus a 100 at headquarters, and the NAB headcount should be less than 50. Based on my experience in the tanker business, the cost of UCert will certainly be less than current INPO dues. Imagine multiple INPO's competing for the plant's certification business.
But the real cost of NRC-style regulation is not the direct payments to regulators. It's the two to three hundred people at each plant producing paperwork, the money that spent on stuff and procedures that do little or nothing to imporve safety and most importantly, what it does to competition and the incentive and ability to produce electricity more cheaply.
I am certainly aware of regulation being a burden to the utility. The maintenance rule alone added thousands of man hours tracking equipment reliability and having meetings to discuss goal setting and the process for moving an SSC into or out of goal setting,
What a waste of time and money.
Ken,
What's the maintenance rule? What's a goal setting?
Jack
A classic example of NRC over regulation and a burden on the industry. Myself and my teammates spent hundreds of hours working on implementing this rule which applied to maintenance and engineering being performed on nuclear power plants. A good idea, but such a burden.
The NRC Maintenance Rule, formally known as 10 CFR 50.65, “Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” was issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on July 10, 1991. It aims to ensure that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) critical to the safety of nuclear power plants are maintained to reliably perform their intended safety functions. The rule is performance-based, focusing on results rather than prescribing specific maintenance methods or schedules. It requires licensees to monitor the performance or condition of SSCs against established goals to prevent safety compromises due to ineffective maintenance practices.
Key Aspects of the Maintenance Rule
1. Scope: The rule applies to SSCs that are safety-related, used in emergency operating procedures, or whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuate a safety system. However, some SSCs, like certain radiation monitoring systems, may fall outside its scope, potentially delaying repairs.
2. Monitoring and Goal Setting: Licensees must establish goals for SSC performance or condition and monitor them to ensure maintenance effectiveness. If goals are not met, corrective actions are required. The nuclear industry developed NUMARC 93-01, a guideline endorsed by the NRC, to outline acceptable monitoring programs. Licensees can use alternative methods but must demonstrate equivalence to NRC standards.
3. Risk Consideration: The rule emphasizes risk-significant SSCs, often identified using expert panels. This ensures maintenance prioritizes components critical to safety, reducing the likelihood of failures contributing to accidents.
4. Performance-Based Approach: The rule does not mandate new maintenance techniques or frequencies but requires periodic evaluation of existing maintenance activities to ensure they support safety functions.
Goal Setting Under the Maintenance Rule
Goal setting is a critical component of the Maintenance Rule, designed to ensure that maintenance activities maintain or improve the reliability and availability of SSCs. Key considerations include:
• SMART Goals: Goals should be Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound. For example, a goal might specify reducing equipment failure rates by a certain percentage within a year, aligned with broader safety and operational objectives.
• Safety Focus: Goals must prioritize safety, considering the potential impact of SSC failures on plant safety margins. Licensees often use operating experience, but early implementations showed some neglected industry-wide data, limiting goal effectiveness.
• Monitoring Levels: Goals are typically set at the system or train level for standby systems, though early implementations revealed inconsistencies in monitoring non-risk-significant standby systems.
• Periodic Evaluations: Licensees must periodically assess maintenance effectiveness against goals, balancing reliability and unavailability, and adjust maintenance plans as needed.
• Alignment with Broader Objectives: Goals should align with plant safety and business objectives, such as minimizing downtime or ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements.
Challenges and Lessons Learned
• Early Implementation: Pilot visits to nine nuclear plants in 1995 showed that while licensees were thorough in scoping SSCs, many did not adequately monitor structures or incorporate industry-wide operating experience in goal setting.
• Scope Limitations: Some critical systems, like radiation monitors, are not always covered, leading to potential delays in maintenance.
• Balancing Act: Effective goal setting requires balancing preventive and reactive maintenance (ideally 80% planned, 20% reactive) to minimize equipment failures while maintaining flexibility for unexpected issues.
Impact and Significance
The Maintenance Rule is considered a landmark regulation, praised for addressing a rising trend of maintenance-related safety issues in the 1980s. By focusing on performance outcomes, it reduces the likelihood of human errors or equipment failures contributing to nuclear accidents, acting as a key component of defense-in-depth strategies.
For further details, refer to the NRC’s official guidance at www.nrc.gov or NUMARC 93-01 for industry standards.
If you need specific guidance on implementing the Maintenance Rule or setting SMART goals for a particular nuclear facility, please provide more details, and I can tailor the response further!
Ken,
Thanks.
The wording is mostly motherhood with which nobody can disagree. But how much substantively changed at Diablo in terms of actual inspections and maintenance in 1991? Did inspection frequency or methods change? Did proactive replacement intervals change? Most importantly, could you see the impact on unplanned scrams, downtime, and the like? How many more actual inspectors, fitters, welders, electricians, people who actually put hands on stuff did the plant need to employ? How many more non-hands on people were required?
These are not rhetorical questions. I’d really like to know the answers.
I’ll do my best to try to respond.
No, the maintenance rule did not really have a significant impact on resources or maintenance frequency. Pacific Gas and Electric and the Diablo Canyon Power Plant team had already implemented a preventative maintenance program with regular interval inspections and maintenance. That’s really why the plant has continued to operate so well for so many years because we started early with a thorough Preventative maintenance program.
All the maintenance rule did was add another set of eyes, and because they were from the NRC, we just ended up with more engineers and maintenance supervisors talking about how to correct maintenance problems.
Did it really improve operations as far the frequency of plant shutdowns and scrams, no I do not believe that.Shutdowns and scrams were an economic impact to the company so they were a focus from the beginning and the maintenance rule added little to no benefit in that respect
In fact, we had several major electrical fires from component failures that resulted in trips and scrams that happened after the maintenance rule was implemented. We had a series of unfortunate electrical events that fortunately did not result in any plant injuries.
thanks for asking.
Grok 3, the XAI chatbot has a reasonable answer to your question
Mid point estimate of $5.5 million per year.
https://grok.com/share/c2hhcmQtMg%3D%3D_a5a8014a-351d-41a2-b935-3823c270fe07
Kenneth,
I'm not interested in an AI generated number. I'm interested in your opinion. Can you make a guess at the additional number of people that resulted from the Rule? Is there a record of the staffing levels at DC through time?
GKG's estimate of the should-cost for staffing a nuclear plant is about 0.5 cents per kWh. 5.5e6 usd/kWh goes to about 0.03 cents per kWh, So if we dumbly accept Grok's number, a 6% increase for no real change, other than management being distracted from their real job.
I am an engineer not an accountant. I stated that the answer seems reasonable.
Cost is resources consumed. It should be a primary concern of any engineer.
Let me try again. 5 million USD per year is roughly 50 people. Does that seem like a reasonable increase in the staffing level resulting from the Maintenance Rule? What were the qulalifications of these people? Colleague degree? Engineering degree? I'm just trying to learn from somebody who was there.