Figure 1. Hypothetical Nuclear Tradeoff Curve Here's a simple multiple choice question. Would the planet be better off with a) 2 cent/kWh nuclear power and a Three Mile Island(TMI) or larger release every 2500 reactor years, or b) 4 cent/kWh nuclear power and a TMI or larger release every 17,000 reactor years, or
Good stuff! The only thing I would add is a mention that the average downwind dose from TMI was 0.8 mSv -- less than a chest X-ray. And maybe you could calculate the compensation someone would get for suffering through such a death-defying dose.
Repeat after me. It's dose rate, not dose. Or more precisely, the dose in the repair period.
Assuming the 0.8 mSv was received in one repair, the SNT increase in cancer incidence is 1.3e-7. The LLE is 0.00019 days or about 16 seconds. At $350/day, the compensation is 7 cents.
The curve makes sense if we are talking about only one reactor design. The only way to increase the safety of a PWR is more cost. Bigger and thicker containment buildings, more redundant safety systems, more personnel, more regulations, etc. It doesn't explain why the bureaucrats don't go with cheaper AND safer designs. If all they care about is safety, why don't they favor designs that have zero possibility of meltdown?
I will guess the answer is ignorance, maybe politics, maybe some other reason. That doesn't change the conclusion that we need radical reform, but possibly how we go about pushing for that reform. If we believe the curve, then we must convince them to accept less safety. If something else is at work, we might have more success not fighting their obsession with safety, but rather showing them a safer and cheaper design.
It's true that the tradeoff curve should move down and to the left due to technological progress. And under competitive market pressures it will, but under NRC-style regualtion it wont.
But even if it does, that will not change the basic shape of the curve, nor the incentives facing the regualtor. Under ALARA, they will just move farther up the curve. The PWR is already too safe. There is no technical solution to ALARA based regualtion. The NRC must go.
Has any preacher ever been cursed with a more recalcitrant choir?
Looking it up it appears I can confirm that one of the reasons the Canadian nuclear regulator turned down an application to build the ACR Candu evolution at Chalk River was that it would have released more tritium than the reactors currently on site
The amount of tritium would have been 10x more than a regular light water reactors, but 60x less than a standard Candu
Build a smaller widget and find that the regulatory vise adjusts quite accurately
I'd like to add the consequences of the alternative to each scenario. E.g., How many people die from coal production and burning that could have been nuclear?
Yeah, a bit more on the consequences would have been an improvement.
But I dont like to measure health impacts in deaths. Everybody is going to die. What we talking about is changing when? Lost Life Expectancy is a much better number. Karecha and Hanson should have known this.
I forgot the exact number but wouldn't it take thousands of new reactors all over the world to effect this subtle shift away from the current set up?
We're at around 500 reactors now aren't we?
And new reactors (especially in the states) take forever to build or get cancelled half way through due to cost overruns. It can't just be due to safety regulation.
We already have around 4000 spent fuel ponds at the current reactor sites. And these are problematic under certain "emergency" situations taking years to cask the material if required.
I understand the material would be reused but there would be a much larger number of these ponds with thousands of new reactors therefore increasing the potential for mishaps.
Finally... I don't see why CO2 even enters the room. It's irrelevant. Especially over the time period that is usually forecast for these things -- next hundred years or so.
At this rate... we'll be lucky to make it out of here alive in the next twenty.
Good stuff! The only thing I would add is a mention that the average downwind dose from TMI was 0.8 mSv -- less than a chest X-ray. And maybe you could calculate the compensation someone would get for suffering through such a death-defying dose.
Mike,
Repeat after me. It's dose rate, not dose. Or more precisely, the dose in the repair period.
Assuming the 0.8 mSv was received in one repair, the SNT increase in cancer incidence is 1.3e-7. The LLE is 0.00019 days or about 16 seconds. At $350/day, the compensation is 7 cents.
Sorry, the only rate I know of for TMI is "one scary day." :)
So how is the rate, or repair period (the LLE?) determined in a release?
Anybody who focuses on cumulative dose is an LNTer.
Pls check out https://gordianknotbook.com/download/replacing-lnt-with-snt and all the other SNT and compensation related pieces.
The repair period is a few minutes up to a day. SNT uses a day to be conservative.
The LLE is based on the increase in cancer incidence and the lost life due to cancer,
The choir needs to start reading the hymnal.
Thanks, Jack. Will do.
The curve makes sense if we are talking about only one reactor design. The only way to increase the safety of a PWR is more cost. Bigger and thicker containment buildings, more redundant safety systems, more personnel, more regulations, etc. It doesn't explain why the bureaucrats don't go with cheaper AND safer designs. If all they care about is safety, why don't they favor designs that have zero possibility of meltdown?
I will guess the answer is ignorance, maybe politics, maybe some other reason. That doesn't change the conclusion that we need radical reform, but possibly how we go about pushing for that reform. If we believe the curve, then we must convince them to accept less safety. If something else is at work, we might have more success not fighting their obsession with safety, but rather showing them a safer and cheaper design.
MacQuigg,
It's true that the tradeoff curve should move down and to the left due to technological progress. And under competitive market pressures it will, but under NRC-style regualtion it wont.
But even if it does, that will not change the basic shape of the curve, nor the incentives facing the regualtor. Under ALARA, they will just move farther up the curve. The PWR is already too safe. There is no technical solution to ALARA based regualtion. The NRC must go.
Has any preacher ever been cursed with a more recalcitrant choir?
Looking it up it appears I can confirm that one of the reasons the Canadian nuclear regulator turned down an application to build the ACR Candu evolution at Chalk River was that it would have released more tritium than the reactors currently on site
The amount of tritium would have been 10x more than a regular light water reactors, but 60x less than a standard Candu
Build a smaller widget and find that the regulatory vise adjusts quite accurately
I'd like to add the consequences of the alternative to each scenario. E.g., How many people die from coal production and burning that could have been nuclear?
https://www.mattball.org/2022/10/environmentalists-are-literally-making.html
Matt,
Yeah, a bit more on the consequences would have been an improvement.
But I dont like to measure health impacts in deaths. Everybody is going to die. What we talking about is changing when? Lost Life Expectancy is a much better number. Karecha and Hanson should have known this.
>Everybody is going to die.
True!
https://www.mattball.org/2023/09/everybody-dies.html
I forgot the exact number but wouldn't it take thousands of new reactors all over the world to effect this subtle shift away from the current set up?
We're at around 500 reactors now aren't we?
And new reactors (especially in the states) take forever to build or get cancelled half way through due to cost overruns. It can't just be due to safety regulation.
We already have around 4000 spent fuel ponds at the current reactor sites. And these are problematic under certain "emergency" situations taking years to cask the material if required.
I understand the material would be reused but there would be a much larger number of these ponds with thousands of new reactors therefore increasing the potential for mishaps.
Finally... I don't see why CO2 even enters the room. It's irrelevant. Especially over the time period that is usually forecast for these things -- next hundred years or so.
At this rate... we'll be lucky to make it out of here alive in the next twenty.