Figure 1. The Rate Payer with the Pigs in charge
And after all, your pigs are far more intelligent than the other animals, and therefore the best qualified to run the farm --- in fact there couldn’t have been an Animal Farm at all without them, so that what was needed (someone might argue), was not more communism but more public-spirited pigs.[T S Eliot, rejecting Orwell’s Animal Farm manuscript on behalf of Faber and Faber Ltd Publishers, 1944]
Whenever I rant against ALARA, I can be sure somebody will push back with the better pigs argument. We just need regulators who are more “public spirited”, willing to forego their own selfish interests, including keeping their family fed, in order to take a risk that is well taken from an overall societal welfare point of view.
I am tired of regurgitating the definition of ALARA. One last time. Our imposition of ALARA mandates that the regulator keep the risk of harm from a release as low as reasonably achievable. If a requirement that might reduce radiation harm can be implemented in a manner that the plant can afford, that requirement is “reasonably achievable” by any reasonable definition of the term. The regulator who decides that requiring HEPA filters on a turbine hall is not reasonably achievable is not only risking his job if we have a casualty that puts a lot of radioactive material in the turbine hall, he is violating our clear instructions. He should be fired for disobedience.
It is beyond me that otherwise intelligent people can’t understand this simple logic. But they do not. We still have ALARA. So let me try another approach. Legally, ALARA implies two things:
1) The regulator can question everything.
2) The regulator is always right.
With something as complex as a nuclear power plant, even in situations where the rules are quite specific, there are bound to be gray areas. Despite a tight 200 page Spec, referencing all manner of multi-volume codes, we had innumerable disputes with the shipyards in my four years of building big tankers in Korea.
But we also had a resolution process by which an unreasonable interpretation of the Spec by either the yard or us would be punished. Importantly, this meant that the outcome of these disputes was predictable within a narrow range. In particular, the yard knew the customer could not bend the rules in a way that changed the overall cost of the ship very much. As a result, the yard was willing to sign a fixed price contract, with substantial penalties/bonuses for late/early delivery. Everybody in the yard was laser focused on being under budget and on time. In particular, they could not afford any delays caused by failure to meet the Spec’s quality requirements.
ALARA implies the Spec doesn’t mean much. The regulator can invoke ALARA at will. The gray areas are vastly enlarged compared to a normal commercial contract. In fact, everything’s a grey area. Even worse, the resolution process is: the regulator’s position wins. No matter what that position is, the regulator wins. This creates crippling uncertainty. The plant builder can’t confidently predict what the regulator’s position will be on any of the very large gray areas that ALARA creates. He would be nuts to sign a turnkey contract. Nuclear is forced into the world of cost plus contracts. The builder’s incentives become milk the project for a much money as possible for as long as possible. Everything goes to hell.
Nothing in this argument requires an unreasonable regulator. ALARA by design gives the regulator dictatorial control over the project. If LNT is correct, which we have told the regulator is how he must evaluate risks, a big release could be catastrophic. Reasonable interpretations of what is prudent could vary widely. All that’s required to make fixed price contracts untenable is that the builder can’t be sure that the regulator’s definition is nearly the same as his definition. ALARA guarantees that uncertainty.
We recently had an instructive counter-example. The Koreans reportedly signed a fixed price and schedule contract for two APR1000’s with the Czechs. EDF immediately sued claiming that, given EU regulatory uncertainty, nobody could sign a fixed price contract without some sort of backstop from the Korean government which would violate EU rules. It’s a very strong point; but the Koreans were able to convince the Czech court that there was no such backstop. And there is no reason for the Korean government to transfer the costs of European stupidity to their own people.
The Koreans had recently completed four APR1400’s in the UAE, a very expensive place to do business, for around $4000/kW. I am reliably informed that the Koreans made money on the project and are prepared to sign another contract with the UAE on similar terms. They can build plants at home for less than $3000/kW. But for the contract with the Czechs, the Koreans demanded $8600. My interpretation is the difference is largely the margin the Koreans think they need to cover EU regulatory uncertainty. The Koreans are gambling that a factor of close to three will cover the costs of that uncertainty.
I think it’s a bad gamble; but it is an estimate of the cost of ALARA imposed uncertainty by a knowledgeable group. As long as ALARA is the basis for nuclear regulation, we will never have anything close to should-cost nuclear, regardless of the quality of the pigs.
You make good and clear points, as always. Change of NPP treatment cannot relly on one president, one more knowledgeable Energy Secretary, or some more competent NRC exec etc. I really like the word "reasonable" though as used in normal colloquial language. How about it being stricktly defined in regulations context a bit like:
ALARA Where:
-Reasonable means cost competitiveness in mind(NPP displaces coal, NatGas- which improve environment and health conditions, which must be weighted as strong benefit- If not NPP then there will be coal, gas, or something more expensive leaving less money for people- like imaginary solar PV and wind with enormous batteries and gas backup). Poor people are less healthy.
-Reasonable regulations of NP cannot be significantly stricter than what is imposed on Natural gas or coal industry or any other similar industrial activity. There is a track record of incidents to demonstrate real scale of risks which clearly is lower than LNT estimates. NPP must have some exclusion zone because that is one difference between coal/gas plant(longer lasting contamination of land)- but You have great idea for that zone not being anyhow enormous.
-New regulations on existing plant designs can be imposed only if regulator can prove significant, measurable decrease of health risk in credible accident scenario. Alternative Measures like enhanced training must be considered in evaluation before imposing anything. Evaluation of existing designs must be done on the Regulator budget. Comparison to coal instead of NPP is good standard for that. If there would be coal power plant on the site instead of NPP(because of cost increase) even with postulated accident- would health outcome be net positive for the population?
-Regulation on new designs and potential new regulations on existing, certified designs can be challenged with independent arbitrator. NPP designers can provide alternative (cost competitive, more practical) means of dealing with postulated event to the arbitrator.
-Budget of the regulatory body tied to the revenue from the generation from existing and future power plants.
-Activities like cleanups of contaminated sites must be reasonable- which means limited in costs to acceptable standard- target levels of decontamination shouldn’t be lower than what is a background radiation in places when healthy populations live and harms from radiation cannot be measured. It is perfectly fine to fence some limited areas and make them as nature reserves if that is cheaper and limited in scope (like many abandoned post industrial sites on this planet). Populated places with higher background could be a reasonable point of reference here?